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Introduction 
 
The psychology of memory appears to be entering a phase of transformation, with 
regards to autobiographical memory (AM), at least. The role of others, of the cultural 
landscape, is no longer confined to the peculiar interests of the social psychologist, 
cultural theorist, or anthropologist. And in contemporary AM work, the individual and 
culture are now to become ever more conceptually and empirically unified (Boyer & 
Wertsch, 2009), and there are now greater numbers of psychologists wishing to 
conceptually and empirically demonstrate the link between private mentatation and the 
collective cultural landscape out of which such memorial activities emerge (Nelson & 
Fivush, 2004, Conway & Jobson, 2012).  
 
As social psychologists, it is perhaps unsurprising that we welcome this move towards 
examining remembering in cultural context, with unreserved enthusiasm. Understanding 
the social and cultural processes that ‘make’ remembering, is at the centre of our work on 
how people expreience, and make sense of, difficult memories (e.g. sexual, physical and 
emotional abuse, adoption, incarceration, disasters) (Brown & Reavey, 2015). It is with 
these ‘vital memories’ (in that we argue they are ‘vital’ to a sense of self in the present) in 
mind that our aim in this chapter is to open up a dialogue, regarding the manner in which 
certain key aspects of autobiographical memory have been conceptualised. In particular, 
we provide an alternative way in which to conceptualise three key elements – memory 
function, culture and self. More specifically, we draw on the idea of what we call the 
expanded model of memory (Brown & Reavey, 2014; 2015), to explore how memory 
function, culture and self, require situating beyond the boundaries of private mentations 
(even if influenced by culture), and are threaded into, and afforded by, the material world 
(see Ingold, 1996; 2013). We also wish to explore the idea that discrepancies or 
ambiguities in memory can serve productive purposes for the ongoing negotiation of self, 
as it unfolds in the present. The self, thus, is never fully complete, but involved in 
constant negotation and meaning making. This approach will, we hope, assist in 
illustrating further the productive links between memory function, culture and self that 
currently circulate in the autobiographical memory literature. 
 
The Origins of Autobiographical Memory: function, culture and self 
 
Work on Autobiographical Memory (AM) is increasingly concerned with how 
recollections of the past are shaped by the ongoing needs and projects of the present self 
and with the cultural communities that shape its emergence and development (Berntsen, 
2012; Nelson, 2009; Conway & Loveday, 2015). This focus on the functional significance of 
memory, that is, the role of the past in creating and/or maintaining current self and 
identity, treats memory as a reflexive activity, that moves with the concerns of the 
present. As Bluck (2003: 113) summarises it: ‘the primary concern is not with how much 
or how well humans remember their personal past (although those features often play 
some role), but instead with why and how humans remember both mundane and 
significant life events. What functions does it serve prople to remember, reflect on, and 
share with others, the experiences of their lives?’. 
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One answer to the ‘how’ question comes from Martin Conway’s influential cognitive 
psychological model of AM and the self-memory system (SMS). This posits that our 
memories of particular events are shaped by our current concerns as they are cognitively 
organised by the ‘working self’ (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  The working self is 
responsible for organising event specific, as well as general knowledge, and is functionally 
oriented towards current goals and identity maintenance. In short, we typically recall 
events and feelings that help to support our present views about who and what we are, 
and which also help us to solve problems that are relevant to us in the present time, and 
help to anticipate likely futures (Pasupathi, 2012). 
 
This functional approach builds upon evidence from developmental studies that AM 
emerges as a critical developmental skill, somewhere around the 3rd or 4th year of life 
(Fivush et al, 2011). Early interactions can lead to the shaping of recollections in a 
number of significant ways, including, for example, enduring gendered styles of 
remembering, in both children and adults (Fivush, 1998). Conversational exchanges have 
been examined in detail to look at the instructional and pedagogical cues delivered by 
parents that direct the meaning focus of children’s recollections (Nelson, 2004), assist 
children in distinguishing their own private memories from the memories of others, as 
well as identifying themselves as the directive agent in their recollections. In childhood, 
‘reality monitoring’ can be subject to error, with recurrent source confusions, including 
the confusion between self-memory or episodic memory and general episode memory. 
This suggests that how we come to learn about ourselves over time, mainly through the 
medium of recollection, can be entangled with the stories of others (Roberts and Blades, 
2000) and with broader cultural narratives (Nelson, 2003).   
 
Function in relation to the (cultural) self 
 
The embedding of the psychological in sociocultural frameworks seems crucial to 
addressing how AM emerges as a human capacity (see Nelson & Fivush 2004). But it 
further seems to be of central importance to understanding the ‘why’ question. Pillemer 
(1998) points to the value of recounting autobiographical memories for maintaining 
social ties. Telling stories of one’s involvement in past events ‘serves a significant social-
cultural function; the acquisition of such sharing means that the child can enter into the 
social and cultural history of the family and community’ (Nelson, 1993: 178). AM 
provides the means for offering a self-narrative of belonging and membership with the 
people and groups around us. 
 
But the implications of the functionality of AM can be pushed still further. Perhaps our 
very sense of ‘self’ is bound up in an emergent capacity to tell stories of our personal 
past. Katherine Nelson and Robyn Fivush have argued for a social constructivist 
approach to AM where self and memory become entwined through the construction of a 
‘life narrative’ (see Nelson & Fivush, 2004). This involves both the kind of autonoetic 
awareness (mentally placing ourselves or travelling back in time) described by Tulving, 
and the reflexive ability to do what Bartlett (1932) described as ‘turning around on one’s 
own schemas’, or simply put, telling stories from memory about ourselves to others. This 
principle of constructing meaning via interrelationships with others does not only hold 
sway for children, but also plays a role in identity formation in adulthood. Memories are 
thus a result of both actual experience and the social construction of those experiences, 
through joint interaction with others (Pasupathi, 2001).  
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Remembering thus becomes an act of self and meaning making for the individual. It 
serves as a foundation for identity across time (Baddeley, 1988). If this is so, then as 
Conway (2005) observes, the strict accuracy, or ‘correspondence’ of a given recollection 
needs to be considered in relation to its ‘coherence’ with other recollections and the 
rememberer’s self-beliefs. In many cases then, coherence is more important than 
correspondence. In a remarkable statement, Conway & Loveday argue for what they call 
a modern view of human memory, where what is remembered as AM is a selective 
construction that may compress time, mix together events and engage with imaginative 
leaps: 
In the modern view of human memory memories are … transient constructions 
and although they many to some degree accurately represent the past they are 
time-compressed and contain many details that are inferred, consciously and 
non-consciously, at the time of their construction. Thus, all memories are to 
some degree false in the sense that they do not represent past experience literally 
… One of the main functions of memories is to generate meanings, personal 
meanings that allow us to make sense of the world and operate on it adaptively. 
Memories are, perhaps, most important in supporting a wide range of social 
interactions where coherence is predominant and correspondence often less 
central. (Conway & Loveday, 2015: 7) 
Critics of the cognitive-experimental psychology of memory have often accused its 
practitioners of being obsessed with matters of accuracy and of being ignorant of the 
wider social practices in which remembering is enacted (for example, Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Middleton & Brown, 2005). Conway & Loveday’s summary of the modern view of 
memory dramatically closes the supposed gap between cognitive and social-discursive 
approaches. Both, we can belatedly recognize, are principally concerned with the 
constructive nature of remembering, the social functions it performs, and the generation 
of personal meanings that allows for the enactment of self identity. 
 
We welcome entirely the acknowledgement of the convergence of cognitive and social 
approaches upon a shared set of problems.  Going forward the task will be, we believe, 
to develop these mutual problems without lapsing back into distracting debate around 
methodological or epistemological differences. There are three principal issues, which, 
for us, seem to define the cognitive-sociocultural problem space of AM. We outline 
these, whilst speaking to a set of issues that inform our work on vital memories, more 
specifically. 
 
The first concerns the functionality of memory. If AM is functionally oriented – that is, 
remembering personal memories accomplishes something in the here and now – then 
how are we to understand the recollection of ‘difficult’ or ‘painful’ events that are 
disruptive of current self and actions? The common position taken is that certain kinds 
of experience are so extreme (i.e. childhood abuse, witnessing violence or catastrophic 
events) that memory distortions arise to protect the working self from subsequently 
having to engage with them, or that the working self may itself be disrupted due to some 
deficit (i.e. an underlying psychiatric disorder) such that it becomes unconstrained by the 
need to create coherence or correspondence in AM (Conway & Loveday, 2015)1. 
However this is to assume a prior normative set of values by which different kinds of 
recollections might be distinguished. One of the characteristics of distressing memories is 
often that the person recollecting finds it difficult to arrive at judgments as to whether 
they are wholly ‘bad’ or may, perhaps, contain elements that are of value. Establishing 
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the meaning and value of a difficult memory is part of the process of recollection, and 
may indicate that complex sociocultural functions are being enacted. 
 
This leads us immediately into the second issue. It is difficult to establish exactly what 
functions may be served by a given recollection, however incoherent or lacking in 
veridicality it may be, without first analyzing the practical contexts in which it is 
produced (e.g. in a therapy session, at a family meeting). Our relationship to distressing 
aspects of our personal past often ambiguous and shaped considerably by the practices 
and setting in which it is recollected. Moreover, even recollections that have good fit 
with ‘normative’ life stories (e.g. starting a new job, getting married) may be told in very 
different ways depending on the interactional contexts in which they become relevant 
(conversations between either a present, or past partner). Setting and practice are then 
crucial sites where the relationship between culture and the individual is mediated.  
 
Thirdly, the useful distinction made by Conway (2005) between correspondence and 
congruency in AM, shifts attention to the nature of the ‘self’ processes through which 
the congruency of a given recollection is established. The ‘conceptual self’ described by 
Conway et al 2004 is comprised of culturally prescribed self-images, beliefs and life 
stories. But if these memories that inform these representations and narratives are 
‘transient constructions’, then how stable is the conceptual self through and around 
which they cluster? Is it appropriate to speak of a self as a ‘thing’ at all (however 
schematically) rather than as ongoing process or project? In what ways is it best to 
conceive of stability and change in relation to self? We will address some of these issues 
by turning to what we refer to as an expanded model of memory, to examine the link 
between function, culture and self further, and its emergence in material settings. 
 
Expanding the Domain of Autobiographical Memory 
 
Conway and Jobson (2015) offer the following as an example of what they call ‘broken 
memories’ to differentiate between individuals who possess stability (and thus coherence) 
and those who do not. Largely their differentiation appears to be based upon a 
separation of those who experience trauma or those diagnosed with a psychiatric 
disorder, and the remainder of the population. According to Conway & Jobson then, 
broken memories (belonging largely to the former) are instances where there is 
disruption to AM processes, brought about by extreme events or extant underlying 
pathologies. The examples they provide are meant to analytically frame the normal 
functioning of AM by illustrating its potential malfunctions (what is usually called a 
‘deviant case’). They describe the following: 
One patient, for example, had been sexually abused by his grandfather from ages 
of 4 to 12. He had a persistent and intrusive flashback in which he was naked in a 
bathroom being pushed against the radiator by his naked grandfather. In this 
intrusive fragment he saw himself from an observer perspective as he was now, a 
balding 35-year old, and saw in the memory his grandfather as a frail 70 year old. 
In fact it became clear during therapy that he had been 6 at the time and his 
grandfather was in his 40s. The false (coherence) memory served the function of 
obscuring the fact that he had been a helpless victim. (Conway & Jobson, 2015: 
7) 
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For Conway & Jobson, there are two issues with this memory. It is seen from the 
position of the observer, rather than as the one who experienced the event, and it 
transposes the patient’s2 and the abuser’s current ages with their chronological ages at the 
time the event was thought to have occurred. The shift in perspective is treated as a 
normal distortion, but the swapping around of ages is taken to indicate the falseness of 
the memory in terms of its overall coherence. It worth noting that contra to the way that 
‘false memory’ scholars such as Elizabeth Loftus might deal with such an example, 
Conway and Jobson do not question the overall correspondence of the recollection (i.e. 
that it refers to something that actually occurred), nor doubt that the recollection may 
have some function for the patient – namely that of masking his victimhood – and do 
not seize upon the context in which it was produced as further evidence of the 
malfeasance of therapeutic professionals in co-producing false memories. That said, we 
would see the function of the memory in slightly different terms. The substitution of the 
ages, for example, might be seen as not so much masking victimhood, but an explicit 
(though not necessarily deliberate) turning around on it. The recollection renders the 
original event ambiguous in a number of ways. There is a reversal of power. The 
powerful adult becomes a weak, elderly man. The powerless child is transformed into as 
the man the patient is now. This may reflect the contemporary relationship between the 
patient and the abuser – perhaps it is the grandfather who is now vulnerable and unable 
to defend himself. In transforming the event in this way, the recollection proposes that 
powerlessness in the past need not determine relations of power in the present. In fact, 
in the original account of the case in Conway et al (2005), we learn that the patient had 
continuously ‘updated’ their age in the recollection throughout their adult life to ‘make 
him seem as adult as he could be’ (p. 529).  
 
Questions of agency can be also posed differently through the substitution of ages. 
Victims of child sexual abuse can experience difficulties in separating their adult 
conceptions of what constitutes agency from those of a child when they reflect back on 
their experiences (Haaken, 1999; Lamb, 2000; Reavey & Brown, 2006; Reavey, 2009). It 
is common in most therapeutic practices to encourage survivors not to mis-attribute 
adult notions of choice to their child self. This appears to be what was done in the course 
of the cognitive therapy in which the patient participated, and which resulted in what 
were deemed to be good therapeutic outcomes (see Conway et al, 2005). But settling 
matters of agency, arriving at a clear sense that one did not have a choice over what 
happened, can also be very problematic, since it carries with it the implication that past 
victimhood may determine one’s current sense of agency (see Reavey & Brown, 2006; 
2009). Moreover it can mean denying ambiguous feelings – albeit ones that are often 
challenging and threatening – that were part of the experience. In the original account, it 
is stated that the patient recollects feelings of sexual arousal during the later years of the 
abuse, which led him believe that he was ‘at fault and an equal participant in the activity’ 
(Conway et al, 2005: 529). Whilst we can be utterly clear that legally and morally this was 
not the case, there may nevertheless be some value in exploring these feelings further 
(this might have been a starting point had the patient been enrolled in a different kind of 
therapeutic practice), because they offer an alternative to what Janice Haaken (1999) calls 
a ‘master narrative of abuse’. Substituting the ages in the recollection potentially keeps 
questions of choice open, which may be of some benefit to the patient in their long-term 
struggles to accommodate the experience into their changing version of self (i.e. not 
simply in terms of the short-term goals of the cognitive therapy, important as they are) 
(see also Reavey, 2010). Responsibility and accountability are thus rendered ongoing, 
rather than complete and finite. 
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Finally, from the details given in both papers it is not clear whether or not the abuse has 
been subsequently acknowledged by the grandfather or others, or subject to legal 
measures (although, as in the vast majority of cases, the abuser silenced the child at the 
time with threats of the consequences of disclosure). Responsibility for what happened 
may not have been either informally or formally addressed. The recollection thematises 
some of the key issues that might have been ‘live’ for the patient at the time of its 
production – Is my grandfather in his current state still culpable for his actions? What 
might it say about me, as an adult, that I need this elderly man, who is close to death, to 
be punished? Are we different, as middle aged men, him, then and me, now? A very 
important detail here is that it was the patient, as a 12 year old, who ultimately, put a stop 
to the abuse when he was ‘physically strong enough to retaliate’ (Conway et al, 2005: 
529), rather than any of the adult carers who were present during his childhood. Perhaps 
the switching of selves is speaking to a very powerful idea – this is someone who has 
always had to be ‘the grown up’, and take responsibility for his own fate, whilst being let 
down by the adults around who have so woefully neglected or abused their own duties of 
care. 
Overall, we think this example offers some very different suggestions about how to treat 
functionality in AM. It is very difficult to establish which functions a given recollection 
of personal experience may be serving in isolation from other details of the person’s life. 
In the example above, the current relationship between the patient and their family, 
including the grandfather, is highly relevant to understanding what this recollection may 
be doing. The swapping of ages could be a way of resisting a victim narrative, or it could 
be a vivid way of thematising an ongoing sense of injustice. Indeed there may be several 
identity-relevant functions being performed simultaneously. Functions can also ‘mis-fire’. 
They can accomplish some social acts, but also have significant unintended 
consequences. In the example, the patient’s continuous updating of his age in the 
recollection seems to have brought with it a sense of being active rather than passive as a 
child, which may have been of value to him in his struggles in adult life. But over time, 
this has come at the colossal cost of increasingly attributing agency to his past self, which 
has become increasingly problematic. We cannot then treat the potential functions of 
AM in any clear-cut way – they are likely to be multiple, sometimes contradictory, 
contextually bound, and rarely unitary in their effects (Reavey & Brown, 2009).  
Expanding cultural selves 
Many contemporary accounts of AM hold that social conventions, in the form of 
culturally generated life scripts (e.g. marriage, going to college, being a house, having a 
child), help organise autobiographical memories by providing the basis for life narratives, 
beliefs and values (Conway & Jobson, 2012; Berntsen & Bohn, 2009). These in turn 
influence the structuring of goals, which are organized hierarchically (Conway, 2005). 
One of the difficulties that the patient in Conway & Jobson’s example doubtless 
confronts is that their experiences of childhood sexual abuse do not map onto the kinds 
of cultural life scripts that are normatively valued. They face the challenge of trying to 
produce a coherent life story using sociocultural narrative resources that do not help to 
articulate their lived experiences. It is not then surprising that the outcome is what 
Conway and Jobson call a ‘false (coherence) memory’. 
 
But is coherence – the sense of there being an order, stability and meaning to our 
recollected past experiences – an achievable goal, not just for this particular patient, but 
more generally within AM? As Katherine Nelson (2003) observes, the very idea that we 
have unique life histories to narrate is a comparatively recent historical construction, and 
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is subject to considerable cultural variation and social change. What constitutes 
‘coherence’ depends greatly on local sociocultural standards and practices. There are, for 
example, cultural representations and life narratives of ‘survivorship’ following child 
abuse and neglect that have emerged in the past two decades, which the patient in the 
example above may or may not have been able to access. However, to see coherence as 
the outcome of applying external representational frameworks to one’s own experiences 
is reach for a quite static conception of culture, as a stockpile of pre-existing narrative 
themes, norms and collective representations. This contrasts with the view of culture 
typically expressed in contemporary social anthropology and related disciplines such as 
archaeology, where culture is treated not as a ‘thing’ that is transmitted to us from on 
high, it is rather a process, in continual negotiation, with attendant contradictions and 
potential resistance by members of that culture (Cole, 2005). Meaning and value are 
outcomes rather than inputs into the sociocultural work of mobilizing the past in the 
present. Our personal pasts are, to some degree, interpretively open and that the cultural 
resources we may draw upon to engage in the work of establishing current significance 
very rarely offer the means of clearly fixing what a given event means right now. The 
term ‘culture’ names this live, contextually bound process of mobilising the past on the 
ground, so to speak, in our interactions with others, and in our relations with the settings 
of the material world. Materiality thus, is as integral to function, culture and self, as 
language or script. And it is out of these diverse settings that the function of memories 
shift accordingly. 
The relevance of setting 
 
What this suggests is the need for the analysis of the specific settings, persons and 
materials that are involved in the personal work of recollection. It really matters that the 
recollection in the example was given during the course of a therapeutic encounter, and 
that this therapy was provided following the patient’s engagement with an ‘educational 
group workshop on borderline personality disorder’ (Conway et al, 2005: 529). 
Remembering is shaped by the nature of the practice and setting through which it occurs. 
For instance, if the patient had been making a legal witness statement about the same 
event, it is likely that matters of correspondence and coherence would have been jointly 
managed with the professional concerned very differently. We recollect stories about our 
personal experiences differently, depending on the interlocutors to whom the story is 
told and with an awareness of what the likely implications could be of how the story 
might subsequently be acted upon. In this case, the outcome of telling the event with 
ages transposed in cognitive therapy was that the patient was encouraged to reformulate 
their recollection to restore correspondence with likely ages at the time. A different kind 
of therapy might have sought to work on the memory in another way. And if the process 
has been legal, rather than therapeutic it is likely that in the time between initial statement 
and court proceeding, the patient would have been guided to refine their recollection to 
fit with the requirements of clear evidence.  
 
Both correspondence and coherence in personal memory is not just up to us, as 
individuals, to constitute and sustain. It is jointly accomplished with others in the settings 
where it relevant, drawing on the sociocultural and material resources that are to hand. 
Questions of bias are not really relevant here. If, as Conway & Jobson (2005) assert, 
there is no literal representation of past experience, then what is available for analysis are 
occasioned, setting-specific acts of recollection that are fashioned in the moment from 
available cultural resources. From this it follows that cognition has to be treated as a set 
of processes that are embedded in the world. As John Sutton and colleagues argue, 
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remembering engages both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ resources in a relation of 
complementarity (Sutton et al, 2010; 2011). Their ‘distributed-scaffolded’ approach is 
richly suggestive of possible ways of thinking about relationships between ‘in-the-head’ 
and ‘environmental’ resources. Or as Clark (1997) has it, cognition comprises a 
‘heterogeneous assembly of brains, bodies, artifacts and other external structures’ (p. 77). 
In the Conway and Jobson example, the patient draws upon neural resources whilst 
recollecting (as indeed we all do in all forms of cognition!), and it may or may not be 
relevant that their deployment of their neural resources is mediated by a prior history of 
‘smoking large amounts of cannabis’ and possibly also by use of prescription 
psychoactive medication. But these neural resources constitute but one component of a 
broader, distributed set of loosely coupled resources that are brought together within the 
setting-specific production of their recollection. 
 
Expanding the meaning of the term cognition in this way offers an interesting challenge 
for conceptualizing AM: if remembering is the outcome of distributed processes, then in 
what sense do our memories belong to us? In Conway’s work, it is the role of the ‘working 
self’ to organise episodic memory through threading together its contents with culturally 
derived knowledge. This model draws upon classic work in social-cognitive approaches 
to memory, such as that of Neisser (1993), in positing distinctions within self-knowledge. 
Neisser (1994) distinguished no less than five sources of self-knowledge, ranging from 
information provided by direct perception (the ‘ecological self’) to higher-level material 
such as internalized cultural beliefs (the ‘conceptual self’). But this kind of theorizing 
arguably leans too far on the assumptions of early cognitive science, where the problem 
to be explained is how information from the environment gets ‘inside’ the cognitive 
system. By contrast, contemporary cognitive science that builds upon Clark’s ‘extended 
mind’ hypothesis (see Clark & Chalmers, 1998) expands the cognitive system beyond the 
boundary of the brain and skin into communicative and material relations. Consequently 
what counts as ‘the self’ or ‘self knowledge’ includes relations with others, material 
artefacts and external cognitive technologies.  
 
The shift from early to contemporary cognitive approaches implies that the basic premise 
of AM requires rethinking. Instead of attempting to understand the way that culture ‘gets 
inside’ the person to form the conceptual self, the problem is rather that of explaining 
how a sense of selfhood and personal continuity emerges from the shifting arrangement 
of materials (e.g. brain, bodies, artefacts, settings) that make up the distributed cognitive 
system. For instance, when Conway & Jobson (2015) place the example under the 
heading ‘broken memories’, they are suggesting that continuity in selfhood is the default, 
which is compromised by memories associated with extreme events, against the ‘working 
self’ seeks to protect itself. But if the ‘self-memory system’ is a distributed system, along 
the lines suggested by Clark, then the problem is reversed: how is the felt continuity of 
self extracted from the diverse materials out of which it is constituted? 
 
There are extant philosophical resources that may assist in developing this problem. The 
writing of Alfred North Whitehead (1978), for instance, offers a whole conceptual 
framework for treating personal experience as an ongoing process that gathers together 
varied materials to create ‘actual occasions’ or ‘drops’ of experience. Whitehead argued 
that the flow of awareness is composed of continuously forming ‘events’, which fold 
together diverse entities into a ‘feeling’. Each drop of experience conditions the next, in 
such a way that whilst we can speak of our ‘self’ as being composed of the kind of 
heterogeneous assembly that Clark describes, there is nevertheless a form of continuity 
that emerges as the conditioning of successive drops creates a pathway or general 
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tendency over time. Whitehead then allows us to conceive the way in which ‘your 
personal experience does not happen ‘in’ your mind; your mind simply is the flow of 
your experience’ (Mesle, 2008: 96). Autobiographical memories could then be treated as 
‘chreods’ or emergent patterns that persist through the successive conditioning of 
experience, rather than as internally generated mental representations.  
 
Vital Memories 
 
Our work has explored personal memories concerning distressing or painful events (see 
Brown & Reavey, 2015). We have treated these as a subset of autobiographical memory, 
that we refer to as ‘vital memories’. The principal characteristics of these memories are 
that they offer consider challenges for accommodation into a coherent life narrative since 
they often refer to life-changing events. As such, they cannot be readily dismissed and are 
often treated as central to self-definition. It is important to state whilst many of the 
participants in our studies have engaged with therapeutic practices, we avoid recourse to 
notions of trauma or pathology. Rather than draw upon some kind of ‘deficit’ model that 
conceptualises painful pasts as necessarily resulting in psychological disturbance, we 
prefer to treat as participants as ordinary people who have undergone extraordinary 
events, either directly or vicariously, and who have developed, with the assistance of 
others, ways of living with the past that are, for the most part, fit for purpose (though 
without discounting the sometimes high levels of distress associated with them). 
 
Theoretically, our work was initially derived from the social remembering framework 
developed in discursive approaches to psychology (e.g. Middleton & Edwards, 1990). 
This treatment of memory emphasizes that remembering is a social act that is 
interactionally performed to mobilise a version of the past to accomplish some purpose 
in the present. Function rather than correspondence is the dominant concern in this 
work (see Edwards & Potter, 1992). Memories are descriptions or accounts that are 
constructed and offered to ‘do things’ in the present. This line of thinking has led 
contemporary researchers in Discursive Psychology to dismiss the idea of inner 
mentation as being relevant to analyzing the public performance of psychological 
phenomenon (e.g. remembering, feeling, arguing) (Tileaga & Stokoe, 2015). According 
this perspective, experience is the lived engagement with the world around us, primarily 
enacted in talk-in-interaction, with all its richness and complexity, rather than some inner 
kernel of being (Potter, 2012). 
 
Whilst there is much in this work that continues to inspire us, the notion that all that is 
worth saying about the psychological can be found in empirical analysis of interaction 
seems overly restrictive. At the core of experience is a felt sense of continuity, that we 
have a personal history and are living at a particular time within specific places. Now this 
continuity is subject continuous variation. We are not stable ‘things’ that endure through 
time, but rather collections of changing personal qualities whose unique temporal 
trajectories of activity, or perdurance, defines our being (see Ingold, 2013). We are not 
made of talk alone. The psychological is constituted through the material world, by way 
of the artefacts and features of the settings in which dwell. And also by the complex 
biochemical constitution of the bodies by means of which we feel and act. The 
rethinking of ‘cognition’ in terms of distributed arrangements of resources and capacities 
to act seems to us offer a productive way forward. 
 
We can briefly state what we see as points of connection with Conway’s model of 
Autobiographical Memory. The resources out of which personal recollections are built 
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(i.e. the autobiographical knowledge base) are distributed within a given setting, across 
persons, materials and practices, and typically offer the possibilities for a number of 
versions of the past, some of which are contradictory. In this sense all autobiographical 
remembering is collectively enacted, although it is typically attached to us as persons (i.e. 
we are taken to be the authors of the recollected experience). Correspondence is a 
setting-specific accomplishment that draws on the practices and norms that operant 
within the setting (e.g. courts of law, therapy, family conversations). Coherence is an 
aspiration rather than a settled matter, and reflects our ongoing, situated efforts, to turn 
around on our personal past. Our sense of self (i.e. the conceptual self) is both spatially 
and temporally extended. What we think we are depends on others, and the resources of 
the settings we inhabit. We are also never, in a strict sense, existing in the present 
moment, since our current concerns reach back into the past, seeking meaning, and push 
forward into likely futures, exploring possible implications (Pasupathi, 2012). The self is 
then best thought of as an ongoing project that consists of a shifting array of elements 
(Ingold, 2013). We will now illustrate this further by describing how some of our work 
relates to the three themes of function, culture and self. 
 
The Functionality of Ambiguity 
All autobiographical recollections have some function; they are remembered in the 
course of social structured activity (even if that activity is solitary). The functions served 
by vital memories tend to somewhat ambiguous. Difficult or painful experiences may 
contain multiple layers of contradictory meaning and a range of complex feelings. This is 
particularly so in autobiographical memories of child sexual abuse (see Haaken, 1999). 
There can be considerable time compression, with multiple episodes of abuse condensed 
into particularly vivid scenes, shifts in perspective and ambivalence around feelings and 
intentions (see Reavey & Brown, 2006). Over time, these features of vital memories are 
likely to become more rather than less diffuse, as they are turned around upon in re-
telling. Sorting out ‘what happened’ and ‘what it means now’ can remain lifelong 
concerns. 
 
In one example, Lorna described a recollection of being sexually abused by her older 
brother in a room in their family home. Lorna described how the ambivalent feelings 
that she recalls from that event, which included some elements of pleasure, have been an 
ongoing source of distress to her throughout her adult life. For her, a crucial aspect of 
the abuse is whether her brother was acting on the basis of naïve curiosity or with the 
active intention to sexually abuse his much younger sister. Here she recalls how during 
several episodes, he removed the handle from the door to the room in which the abuse 
occurred, thereby ensuring it was locked from inside. Lorna takes the act of locking the 
door to be an indicator of his active intentions, which leaves her unable to excuse her 
brother for what he did (for further details see Reavey & Brown, 2009). 
 
Here we can see Lorna turning around on her memory to establish correspondence and 
infer motives. The scene she recollects with the arrangement of the siblings around the 
door seems to suggest or ‘propose’ two very different statements – the brother either 
acted with or without conscious awareness of what he was doing. As long as the door 
remains unlocked, then both statements can be in play, and Lorna does not have to 
‘settle’ either her relationship to her brother, nor the meaning of the contradictory 
feelings she experienced. But if she chooses to believe that the detail of the door being 
locked is correct, then the brother is an abuser, she is a victim, and her feelings are a 
source of guilt – because in cultural terms, real victims should never enjoy aspects of 
their abuse.  
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In this recollection, it seems that it is the ambivalence over correspondence that it is 
functional. As long as Lorna does not have to settle ‘what actually happened’, she can 
accommodate the vital memory into her sense of adult self in different ways. To use 
Conway & Jobson’s terms, maintaining uncertain correspondence enables higher and 
more flexible coherence. On this basis, we would suggest that the switching of ages by 
the patient in their example may have accomplished something similar, up until a certain 
point. The broader point here is that the ‘propositions’ that emerge from vital memories 
(i.e. statements about what happened and their significance for the present) are 
inherently neither true nor false, but are realized as such in how we dispose of ambiguity 
and thereby settle on how we ought to orient to the recollection in question (e.g. ‘He 
meant to do it’, ‘I am victim’, ‘I cannot forgive him’). 
 
Most often, the work of either maintaining or settling ambivalence in vital memories is 
done in concert with others. For example, in a study of the strategies which adoptive 
parents maintained to preserve the early memories of their adopted children (see Brown, 
Reavey & Brookfield, 2013), a parent C described a dilemma she was faced with in 
relation to her young adopted daughter. In the recent past the daughter had developed 
what C refers to as an ‘obsession’ with fire. She and her partner had addressed this by 
buying her age appropriate toys such as a firefighters play costume. But C is concerned 
by her daughter’s ‘pyromanic’ interest, because what she knows – and she believes her 
daughter does not yet know – is that her adoption came about because her birth mother 
set fire to their family flat whilst under the influence of alcohol and drugs, for which she 
subsequently received prison committal. The dilemma here is that if C attempts to steer 
her daughter away from pursing her fascination with fire, she may be accused by the 
daughter, at some point later in life, of trying to hide or dispose of her early life. But by 
colluding in this interest, she risks premature disclosure of the personal history at an age 
when she judges her daughter to be insufficiently equipped to manage the details. 
 
The example is a little unusual because it concerns what Marianne Hirsch (1997) calls a 
‘vicarious memory’. The daughter appears not to remember the fire, at present, however 
there is good reason to suppose that in later life the account of the fire – which C is 
adamant that her daughter has the right to know about when she appears to be ready to 
hear the details – will form part of her life story, and the retellings will constitute 
autobiographical memories in their own right. At present, C is acting as custodian of the 
potential memories, in effect managing her daughters access to her own personal past. 
The way that she does this is through maintaining ambivalence. The daughter can 
explore her ‘obsession’ with fire within the safety of the relations of care of the adoptive 
family. We might say that the story of the fire is ‘hidden in plain sight’, awaiting the time 
of its eventual discovery by the daughter, who will then find a place for that episode in 
her life story, which has already been anticipated by its careful management by C.  
 
Setting Specificity 
 
The example of C and her daughter demonstrates that the knowledge that we draw upon 
in constituting autobiographical memory is distributed across our relationships with 
others (see also Harris et al’s studies of older couples joint autobiographical recollections, 
Harris et al, 2014). This raises ethical questions about what our memorial responsibilities 
are to one another. For example, what are our duties in relation to what we hold of the 
personal experiences of others? Do they obtain merely within close personal 
relationships, or do they extend to broader social and professional relationships? 
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Conversely are we entitled to refuse to speak of or even to dispose of what we know of 
other’s lives as and when we see fit? These kinds of questions indicate a point of passage 
between the focused study of autobiographical memory per se, and broader social and 
political questions of the kind posed within what has come to be called Cultural Memory 
Studies (Erll & Nunning, 2008).  
 
In our own work, the intermediate point where psychological and broader ethico-
political questions come together is in the study of specific settings in which 
remembering is performed. If there is broad agreement within the ‘modern’ or, as we 
would term it, ‘expanded’ view of memory, that in principle distinctions between truth 
and falsity of recollections are not meaningful to make, then this does not mean 
abandoning the search for veracity. It simply means acknowledging that the ‘truth’ of a 
given memory depends upon the particular practice and setting where the recollection is 
subject to evaluation, and the criterion that are in play. For example, had the patient 
from Conway & Jobson’s example offered that recollection as part of a legal case against 
the grandfather, the success of the prosecution would probably be in doubt. But in 
therapy, the switching of ages does not undermine the veracity of what is recalled, and 
perhaps even increases its believability because it fits with therapeutic expectations about 
managing traumatic experience.  
 
Our approach to vital memories addresses settings (e.g. professional practices and sites, 
institutions, families etc) as crucial sites where the resources for constituting and 
evaluating personal memories are located. We can make a notion of culture operant here 
as the ways in which we collectively assemble and mobilise versions of the past in 
accordance with the extant practices of the setting. For example, the Reminiscence 
Museum based in the Humanitas care home in Rotterdam, is a somewhat unique space 
of memory (see Bendien, Brown & Reavey 2010; Bendien, 2013; 2009). Constructed in 
the basement of the care home, it consists of a series of rooms arranged with the décor 
and household objects of homes in the Netherlands around the period 1930-1950. There 
is a living room, two kitchen spaces, bedrooms, a child’s nursery, a workshop, and 
several adjoining spaces that are full of period objects. The museum is open to visitors, 
along with elderly clients of the home, and provides a space for viewing the collected 
objects, entertaining visiting families or simply reflection. As might be imagined, the 
museum is extraordinarily successful at facilitating autobiographical memory, even 
amongst visitors who beginning to experience memory problems, and a whole series of 
museums have opened across the country.  
 
Two short stories from the museum demonstrate its power. A group of elderly visitors 
were discussing a washing tub with one of the museum staff, telling stories of how ‘wash 
days’ were organized domestically when they were children. One member of the group 
offers a small recollection of being 8 or 9 and having to carry a bucket filled with 
scalding hot water up the stairs from the communal water heater to the family apartment. 
On another occasion, a different elderly client was in the kitchen with her adult daughter, 
who was visiting. The mother appeared unimpressed with much of what was on display, 
until they looked at an old early mechanical washing machine. On viewing this, the 
mother spoke in quick succession of her teenage school years and early married life, her 
now adult son, who had recently died, and finally a story about the son as a young boy 
which involved him coming into danger when playing near the exposed machine parts of 
a similar washing machine. 
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In both of these cases, we would argue that it is the arrangement of the setting that 
affords the recollection. These autobiographical memories can, and doubtless have been 
told, on other occasions, for other purposes. But the specific form they take when 
recollected in the museum appears to be fitted to the particular circumstances of the 
visit. In the first story, the collective talk around the washing tub is doing a work of 
elaborating a shared history amongst the women. What is not explicit in the brief details 
we have provided is that the way they talk indicates that they all grew up in Rotterdam 
during the 1930s/40s. What they are describing is the city as it was before its partial 
destruction during the second world war, and the hard times of the Hongerwinter (famine 
or ‘hunger winter’) that came towards its end. To talk of wash days is then also to 
acknowledge the loss of that world and the difficult period that ensued. Interestingly, the 
way the story about carrying the water is narrated emphasizes not the danger, but rather 
the resilience of the woman as a young child. The hearable implication of telling this 
story if she could do such things as a young age, then one should not assume that her 
current age makes her vulnerable or infirm. 
 
The second story equally seems to be addressed as much to current circumstances as to 
the past. The elderly mother initially takes their joint viewing of the antiquated kitchen 
appliances as an opportunity to emphasise the difference between her early adult life and 
that of her daughter. This shifts into a memory of a recent loss that then segues into a 
recollected episode where the mother was able to shield her then young son from 
danger. There is a awful lot being done here – the mother is comparing her life with her 
children, emphasizing the difficulties that women of her age faced, and showing how she 
confronted adversity in the past. All of this, which is accomplished in a matter or 
minutes, speaks to her current circumstances and the state of her relationship with her 
daughter as she is passing into the challenges of later life. This recollection, like the one 
before, seems to be uniquely afforded by the very particular sets of resources on offer in 
the setting at that moment – the specific objects they are viewing, the interaction 
between the visitors and the current life circumstances of the person remembering. 
 
The reminiscence museum appears to support coherence in autobiographical memory, 
and authorise elderly visitors to show the relevance of their personal past to an 
understanding of the present. But there are settings where precisely the reverse appears 
to be the case. We have researched the experiences of patients in medium secure forensic 
psychiatric units (see Brown, Reavey, Kanyedredzi & Batty, 2014). These are psychiatric 
hospital units within UK National Health Service (NHS), where persons who have either 
been charged or convicted of criminal offences are transferred following a mental health 
diagnosis which renders them as either having ‘diminished responsibility’ for their ‘index 
offence’ or as unsuited to prison committal. Patients on the unit remain detained under 
the guidance of a section of the Mental Health Act (‘sectioned’) until such time as a 
tribunal agrees their release, which is typically anywhere between 3-10 years, depending 
on the severity of the initial offence and their compliance with psychiatric intervention.  
 
One might imagine that, as a therapeutic space, a concern with the original index offence 
and with the circumstances that led to its occurrence would be central to the practices of 
the unit. In fact, the reverse is the case. Forensic psychiatric care primarily aims at 
‘stabilising’ a patient’s condition until they are judged to be well enough to return to long 
term out patient care within the community. As such, patients are discouraged from 
talking about their life prior to entering the unit, since this is taken to be irrelevant to the 
practice of supporting their current self-management of their condition. Patients typically 
spoke in vague, euphemistic terms of their recent past life (e.g. ‘I was very unwell’) and 
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indicated that they had been made aware that dwelling on this was counter-productive to 
successful progression on the unit (e.g. ‘You don’t want to get deeper into your illness’). 
If the reminiscence museum facilitates coherence, then the secure units seem to actively 
disrupt or suspend coherence, and emphasise the need to dispose of autobiographical 
memory, if only for the time of seeing out one’s section.  
 
What we want to draw attention to by way of these examples, is that coherency in vital 
memories, and, by extension, amongst other kinds of autobiographical memories, is not 
accomplished by the person alone. It necessarily depends upon the settings in which we 
participate, and the relations that are afforded there. Authorship of our life stories may, 
in the final instance, be attributed to each of us alone. But the composition of those 
stories, the resources out of which they are built, and the opportunity to rehearse them is 
a collective, setting-specific process. And whilst we draw upon broader cultural narratives 
and values, they are mediated through the specific practices that define the setting in 
question. 
 
Self as Ongoing Project 
There are almost unbearably weighty philosophical issues involved in conceptualizing self 
in relation to memory (see, for example, Ricoeur, 1990; Bergson, 1992; Stiegler, 2009). In 
the same way that the consensus on memories themselves has shifted from treating 
memories as ‘traces’ or ‘things’ that are stored within the cognitive system, to the notion 
of them being transient constructions that are assembled in the here-and-now to 
accomplish some purpose, so it may be that the challenge ahead is to offer compelling 
conceptual ‘non-foundational’ descriptions of ‘self’ as an ongoing, reflexive process 
rather than a structure or a system that is located somewhere or other (e.g. in the brain, 
in society, or the interaction that lie between them) (see Brown & Stenner, 2009; Reavey, 
2010).  
 
Our own contribution to these emerging debates is to elaborate upon a notion of self as 
spatially and temporally extended. What we are, emerges from the relationships we have 
to others, and from the diverse heterogeneous materials through which we act. If the 
term cognition can be plausibly extended to these distributed arrangements of materials, 
then there is some meaning in considering whether ‘self’ can be similarly dislodged from 
its tradition location ‘in the head’ and into a process unfolding, in the world. Indeed, one 
of the concerns around ‘digital memory’ that has emerged in media studies and elsewhere 
(see Hoskins, 2011; Garde-Hansen, Hoskins and Reading, 2009), is with the 
vulnerabilities and potential fragility of self that arises when so much of our personal 
memories are resourced by networked electronic media whose technical formats and 
proprietary arrangements do not necessarily guarantee its longevity. Think of how much 
of ‘you’ would be compromised by losing your smartphone or by your Facebook profile 
being made inaccessible…  
 
Temporal extension is, we have argued elsewhere (Brown & Reavey, 2015), best thought 
by using metaphors of flow. Although we divide our lives up according to various socio-
chronological conventions, our personal experience is continuous and indivisible. There 
are no pre-existing markers that clearly demarcate our lives into constituent parts. We 
live not some much in the present moment as in a flow where past and future meet, and 
where both are ceaselessly responding to the unfolding of events. Our past is never really 
over – it is reworked and reconstructed as we go along – and our anticipation of the 
future is correspondingly shifting. In this sense, ‘self’ names a project, a work-in-progress 
subject to endless revision, hesitation and reflection. 
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Vital memories provide vivid illustrations of the contingency and potential difficulties of 
this project. For example, survivors of the 2005 7/7 London Bombings found that their 
lives were irrevocably altered in the space of a few hours (see Allen, 2015; Brown, Reavey 
& Allen, 2015). Some survivors suffered life-changing injuries that meant that there 
could no possibility of a return to the life and the aspirations they had had before the 
bombings. Other survivors found that they were immediately caught up in the fast 
developing media and political story. John Tulloch, for instance, was photographed 
leaving the Aldgate underground tube station in a state of distress, with bandages around 
his head injuries and his face covered in blood. During the time of his extensive 
recuperation from his injuries, he discovered that his image had been used (without his 
consent) by a national UK newspaper in a front-page editorial supporting increased anti-
terror legislation. As he put it, he was faced with the task of reconstructing himself at the 
same time as he was being reconstructed by the broadcast media in completely different 
ways and in support of a political project to which he profoundly disagreed.  
 
Tulloch eventually wrote an account of his experiences, in part to rescue his own project 
of remaking himself from competing versions that were in circulation in the media. 
Rachel North, who was on the Piccadilly line train, where the largest number of fatalities 
occurred, also wrote a book in an effort to reclaim her personal experiences. North had 
begun making online posts about what had happened to her on the same day as the 
bombings, and had been invited by the BBC to maintain a blog about the events. This 
led to her engaging with the media and subsequently becoming active in support groups 
for fellow survivors and in campaigning for an enquiry into the official response to the 
bombings. As a consequence, North’s account of her experiences became widely 
circulated. Her book is an attempt to situate that relatively short period of time in 
relation to her broader life story, and in particular to link her distress and recovery from 
the bombings to a previous period in her life where she was a survivor of a serious sexual 
assault (North, 2007). Both Tulloch and North have found that their lives have been 
irrevocably fractured by 7/7 bombings, and have faced the challenge of having their 
experiences reconstructed in multiple ways by others (including so-called 7/7 ‘truthers’ 
who deny that the events happened at all), as well as having to try to accommodate what 
happened into their own project of (re)making themselves.  
 
Tulloch and North’s projects of self-making have been unusually complex, because of 
the highly public nature of the events in which they were caught up. But their 
experiences are exemplary of many other kinds of vital memories. What happened to 
them was an irrevocable change that shifted the flow of their life thereafter, and became 
central to their self-definition. Whilst the significance of the event was clear, the meaning 
of it and the ways in which it ought to be accommodated into their evolving project of 
self was uncertain. In a sense, both Tulloch and North will always be there, on the trains, 
in the immediate aftermath and confusion of the bombings. Everything that they aspire 
to be, that they can be, will have to be routed through this indelible rupture in their lives. 
 
Summary 
In the early 1990s, critics of experimental psychology could confidently assert that the 
mainstream psychology of memory had a woefully under-developed conceptualization of 
the sociocultural contexts in which remembering was performed. Such critiques are 
certainly not pertinent a quarter century later. Research on autobiographical memory is 
one of the most vibrant and progressive areas within the psychology of memory. 
Through the efforts of researchers such as Katherine Nelson and Robyn Fivush, the idea 
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that telling culturally derived and sanctioned stories about oneself is a ‘critical 
developmental skill’ has been successfully embedded. Martin Conway’s recent 
reformulations of his model of the ‘self-memory system’, which has near hegemonic 
status within the field, clearly demonstrate a willingness to take ‘culture’ on board as 
critical component of autobiographical memory. At the same time, recent developments 
in ‘extended’, ‘enactive’ and ‘distributed’ cognition explored by researchers such as John 
Sutton and others are beginning to revise some of the fundaments of cognitive science in 
ways that close the gap significantly with constructionist approaches to psychology, not 
least because they converge on shared problems around how to conceptualise the role of 
external material resources and technologies in psychological functions. 
 
It seems to us that the time has come to put aside squabbles about fine-grained 
philosophical distinctions and methodological (in)securities and recognize a shared 
convergence on a set of problems. In this chapter we have proposed that one starting 
point for seeking a way forward is to reflect on the key issues of function, culture and 
self in relation to autobiographical memory. Our own particular concern is with a subset 
of autobiographical memories that refer to painful or distressing events, which we call 
‘vital memories’. It is important to us that these memories are not treated as in some way 
outside of normal functioning, or as pathological in any way. The participants that we 
have worked with – including people who have been given mental health diagnoses and 
who are currently ‘sectioned’ – seem to us to be doing their best to creatively produce a 
form of coherency in their life stories, using the resources available to them. It seems to 
us that one should not really depart too far from the practice and the setting in which the 
recollection was occasioned in one’s theorizing. Thus in our repeated citing of Conway & 
Jobson’s example, we have been keen to place that example back in what we take to be 
its original context, rather than see it as a jumping off point for abstraction. 
 
The most pressing agenda, as we would see it, it to build upon Conway & Jobson’s 
distinction between correspondence and coherence in autobiographical memory. It is to 
be celebrated that the frankly ludicrous obsession with correspondence as the principal 
evaluative criterion for personal memories, much promoted by Elizabeth Loftus and her 
colleagues, has been superseded with a concern for how recollections of personal 
experiences are fitted into a broader conception of self. However, treating 
correspondence and coherence as dimensions that can be plotted together to create a 
kind of 2 x 2 problem space of remembering does not really do justice to the setting and 
practice specific nature of recollection. We propose that the way forward is to see both 
correspondence and coherence as setting level accomplishments that are indexed to the 
practices that are operant in the setting in question. We further propose that clarity and 
ambivalence are not normative criterion, but are themselves relative to our participation 
in the settings where our autobiographical memories are made relevant. Sometimes we 
need to settle matters. Other times, it works best for us to leave them open. It beggars 
belief that we, as analysts, would dare to assume that we have in principle, definitive 
answers to such highly contextual and situated problems. 
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1 These can be termed the ‘extremity’ and ‘deficit’ models of memory (see Brown & 
Reavey, 2015). 
2 We are using the term ‘patient’ to reflect the description used by Conway & Jobson, not 
because we think this is the most appropriate way in which to refer to individuals using 
services, unless they are de facto patients in a hospital setting. 
